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PREFACE
The words 'principle' and 'policy' have been very common in legal discourse but their meaning is far from self-evident. Principle, in relation to judicial decision-making, has been, almost invariably, a term of approbation; policy has sometimes been used with approval in this context, but has sometimes been contrasted with principle and has carried the implication that policy should be excluded from judicial consideration. Abstract debate conducted in terms of 'what is the true nature of contract law?' has often seemed to run into an impasse, with, on the one side, insistence on rigorous exclusion of all considerations of utility, convenience or policy, and assertion, on the other side, that such are the only relevant considerations. A historical perspective suggests that the dichotomy thereby implied is over-simplified. Principle and policy have not been contradictory, in the sense that one must be chosen to the exclusion of the other. On the contrary, they have been mutually interdependent. A proposition has rarely been accorded the name 'principle' unless it has been perceived to lead to a just result in the particular case under consideration, and to be likely to produce results in the future judged to be acceptable: the concept of principle, at the point in time when it has been invoked, has implicitly looked not only to the past, but also to the present and the future, incorporating residual considerations of justice in the individual case as well as what may broadly be called prudential considerations. On the other side, the influence of policy has been very frequent in contract law, but has generally been found appropriate only where a governing proposition can be formulated that is perceived as stable, workable in practice, appropriate for judicial application, that explains past decisions thought to have been rightly decided and that supplies an appropriate guide for the disposition of future instances. When such propositions have been formulated they have been called principles, but they are not thereby emptied of policy. A consequence of this interrelationship is that, from a historical perspective, contract law cannot be reduced to any single explanatory principle, internal or external. This study seeks to demonstrate these interrelationships by examining the operation of the main features of English contract law (and of systems closely allied to it) as reflected in judicial decisions and in treatises since the eighteenth century: first, the requisites of contractual obligation (intention, agreement and consideration), then the most prominent reasons for non-enforcement of apparent contracts (inequality, mistake and public policy), and then the meaning and scope of the concept of enforcement itself. The perspective is historical, but the recent past is not excluded.
Reference is made at various points to Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference published in six volumes with commentary and notes in 2009. This document, in looking towards a harmonization of European legal rules, explores both the common ground and the differences between the common law and civilian legal systems, and among civilian systems. Whatever may turn out to be the official uses that may or may not be made in the future of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, it is relevant and useful to one seeking an understanding of what has been meant by principle and policy in English contract law, and the relation between the two concepts. The document shows that, when all aspects of each legal system are taken into account, different conceptual starting points have often led not only to similar results in practice, but to similar legal rules, and that general propositions can often be framed that capture both the underlying principles and the underlying policies of apparently diverse systems.
There is another reason why the Draft Common Frame of Reference is of particular relevance. It has been common since the eighteenth century, and earlier, for writers seeking order, simplicity, logic and elegance in English law to look, often somewhat enviously, towards civil law systems. It is necessary therefore, in exploring the meaning that principle has had in English law, to pay some attention to the civil law -or, perhaps it should be said rather, to the idea of the civil law entertained by English observers from time to time. A modern, detailed and reliable commentary, comparing European civilian systems with each other and with English and Irish law in respect of specific rules of contract law, and taking into account the practical working of each system, is a very valuable resource. It shows that, on many points, there has been no single 'civilian' principle that resolves all difficulties, and that all European systems, though using different tools, have had to struggle with conflicts and tensions similar to those that have demanded resolution in English law. Though preface xvii it refers to, it serves to correct a simple contrast between the common law on the one hand and a supposed monolithic civil law on the other. I am greatly indebted to past and present students, and to many friends and colleagues who have kindly read drafts and made helpful comments. I am grateful also to the University of Toronto and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for research leave and financial support, and to Brendan Donovan, Kevin Dorgan, Adam Hirsh, Julian House and Geoff Read for research assistance.
